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people with legitimate access who 
behave in ways that put our data, 
our systems, our organizations, and 
even our businesses’ viability at risk. 
Such behavior might not be mali-
cious; it might be well-intended but 
still have unwelcome consequences.
Considerable research has been 
done to examine the nature of inap-
propriate insider activity, with the 
goal that eventually organizations 
can reduce the threat. Beginning 
in 1999, RAND conducted a series 
of workshops to generate a research 
agenda for addressing this prob-
lem.1–3 In parallel, the US Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) outlined a 
set of policy changes and research 
directions for reducing the insider 
threat.4 And the Software Engi-
neering Institute’s Computer Emer-
gency Response Team (CERT) has 
been working with the US Secret 
Service to understand convicted 
insiders’ motivations.5 From these 
and other efforts, a rich literature 
illuminating various aspects of the 
insider threat problem is emerging.
The Scope of the 
Insider Threat
But how real is the insider threat? 
Many recent anecdotes about cyber-
crime suggest that often the threat 
to an organization’s computer-based 
assets is greater from those within 
the organization than from with-
out. In a 2007 Computer Security 
Institute survey about computer 
crime and security,6 59 percent 
of respondents thought they had 
experienced insider abuse of net-
work resources. About one in four 
respondents said that more than 
40 percent of their total financial 
losses from cyber  attack were due 
to insider activities. However, the 
2008 survey had significantly dif-
ferent results: 
As noted in last year’s report, a 
great deal is made of the insider 
threat, particularly by vendors 
selling solutions to stop insider 
security infractions. It’s cer-
tainly true that some insiders 
are particularly well-placed 
to do enormous damage to an 
organization, but this survey’s 
respondents seem to indicate 
that talk of the prevalence of 
insider criminals may be over-
blown. On the other hand, 
we’re speaking here of finan-
cial losses to the organization, 
and in many cases significant 
insider crimes, such as leak-
ing customer data, may not 
be detected by the victimized 
organization and no direct 
costs may be associated with 
the theft.7 
Credible data describing the 
scope and impact of unwelcome 
insider actions are hard to come 
by, for two reasons. First, many 
organizations are loathe to reveal 
the nature and magnitude of the 
cyber incidents they’ve expe-
rienced for fear of reputational 
harm. Second, most cyber surveys 
are convenience surveys; it’s im-
possible to know what population 
the results represent. This paucity 
of data is challenging for insider 
threat researchers, who need good 
data with which to build models, 
make predictions, and support 
good decision-making. The large-
scale, carefully sampled National 
A
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and networks, breaking through the perimeter de-
fenses we have established to keep out bad actors. 













Computer Security Survey8 sug-
gests that the threat is real and the 
consequences significant:
• Forty percent of all incidents re-
ported by the 7,818 respondents 
(representing 36,000 US busi-
nesses) were attributed to insiders.
• Seventy-four percent of all cyber 
theft was attributed to insiders, 
including 93 percent of embez-
zlement incidents and 84 percent 
of intellectual property thefts.
For the past few years, the Insti-
tute for Information Infrastructure 
Protection (I3P) at Dartmouth 
College (with funds from the US 
Department of Homeland Securi-
ty) has supported a project explor-
ing ways to understand and address 
the insider threat. With researchers 
at Columbia University, Cornell 
University, Dartmouth College, 
MITRE, Indiana University, Pur-
due University, and RAND, we’ve 
examined not only how technol-
ogy can reveal the threat’s nature 
and magnitude, but also how it’s 
influenced by the environment 
in which the insiders operate. 
The overall goal is to suggest ap-
propriate responses to the insider 
threat; after all, the response to an 
insider accidentally selecting the 
wrong menu entry should be dif-
ferent from the response to an ex- 
employee trying to exact revenge.
In our project’s early days, it 
became clear that many ideas ex-
ist about what “insider” means and 
what unwelcome behavior consti-
tutes an “insider threat.” For ex-
ample, insiders are more than just 
employees or ex-employees—they 
can be business partners, audi-
tors, consultants, or other people 
and systems who receive short- or 
long-term access to an organiza-
tion’s systems. Without a unifying 
framework, we have difficulty rec-
ognizing emerging insider prob-
lems, comparing incidents, or 
dealing with them appropriately. 
For this reason, Joel Predd, Shari 
Lawrence Pfleeger, Jeffrey Hun-
ker and Carla Bulford9 developed 
a taxonomy of insiders and their 
actions, which Figure 1 shows. 
The taxonomy doesn’t prescribe a 
uniform definition; rather, it pro-
vides a consistent vocabulary for 
describing clearly which aspects of 
the insider threat problem the re-
search and practice address. It also 
provides the basis for discussing, 
comparing, and contrasting the 
various possible responses to dif-
ferent kinds of insider behaviors. 
The framework takes into account 
the roles of the organization, the 
individual, the IT system, and the 
environment in enabling unwel-
come behavior.
Because not all insiders are 
alike, we must distinguish among 
the different types of insider threat, 
differentiate problems we can ad-
dress from those we can’t, and de-
termine the roles technology and 
policy play in crafting responses. 
Policy is a particularly thorny issue 
because the stated policy (called 
the de jure policy in the taxonomy) 
isn’t always the same as its inter-
pretation and enforcement (the de 
facto policy). For example, most or-
ganizations forbid the use of their 
computer systems for personal use: 
the de jure policy. But in actuality, 
most organizations look the other 
way for some personal uses: the de 
facto policy. Sometimes, the de facto 
policy is stronger than the de jure, 
as when a security guard challeng-
es a worker in the office at 2 a.m., 
even though the worker is wearing 
a proper badge. 
Promising Insider 
Research
In this special issue on addressing 
insider threats, articles by three 
different research groups illus-
trate how technology and policy 
can inform both our understand-
ing of the insider threat and how 
to respond appropriately to its ef-
fects. In “Detecting Insider Theft 
of Trade Secrets,” Deanna D. 
Caputo, Marcus A. Maloof, and 
Greg D. Stephens describe how 
they used their Elicit system to 
observe the relationship between 
insider intent and action. Their 
approach is based on technology 
that looks for violations of de jure 
policy, and they perform a care-
fully designed experiment to see 
whether malicious insiders have 
different behaviors from innocent 
users. Their research is important 
not only for illuminating the na-
ture of malicious behavior but also 
for illustrating how to perform 
high-quality empirical cybersecu-
rity research.
In “Designing Host and Net-
work Sensors to Mitigate the In-
sider Threat,” Brian M. Bowen 
and his colleagues at Columbia 
University also investigate real us-
ers’ insider behavior. Based more 








(perceived policy and intent)
Figure 1. Framework for taxonomy of insiders and their actions. This taxonomy provides a 
consistent vocabulary for describing which aspects of the insider threat are being addressed, 
and takes into account the roles of organizations, individuals, IT systems, and the environment 
in enabling insider threat behavior.9
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of detectors acquires online event 
data created by computer systems 
and applications while insiders 
(users who misused privileges) or 
masqueraders were impersonat-
ing a user whose credentials they 
stole. The authors use the descrip-
tive and behavioral data that their 
system captures with machine 
learning algorithms to identify 
and model abnormal search events. 
Then, they augment this informa-
tion, describing how users actually 
behave, with strategically placed 
decoys that report to a central lo-
cation when documents and data 
are misused. The Columbia re-
searchers’ goal is to understand 
unusual behavior and misuse of 
decoy information so that systems 
can reliably detect insider attack.
The MITRE and Columbia 
articles offer different but mutu-
ally supportive views of modeling 
insider behavior. MITRE ap-
proaches the problem by specifying 
up front what are considered to be 
de jure policy violations as defined 
by subject matter experts. By con-
trast, the Columbia work proposes 
technology to identify unusual or 
bad behavior by learning over time 
about normal and abnormal use. 
Both articles present technology to 
provide insight into insider threats 
and to address the dearth of study 
data available by generating some 
of their own. In each case, their 
rich data sets have information not 
only about observed behaviors but 
also about the context in which the 
behaviors occurred. Each article 
provides a roadmap for generating 
data to test and evaluate proposed 
technology solutions. 
Such data sets can support the 
kind of modeling used in the third 
article. In “Building a System for 
Insider Security,” Felicia Durán 
and her colleagues at Sandia Na-
tional Laboratories use technology 
to model outcomes. Represent-
ing the employee life cycle with 
a system dynamics model, they 
analyze employee interactions 
with insider security protection 
strategies.  Using a scenario involv-
ing prehiring screening and secu-
rity clearance processes, they assess 
important interactions, interde-
pendencies, and gaps in insider 
protection strategies; the results 
should lead to a more effective set 
of responses to the insider threat.
Indeed, the goal of much in-
sider threat research is to make 
more effective the prevention, de-
tection, mitigation, remediation, 
and punishment of unwelcome 
action by the people and systems 
that have legitimate access to our 
networks. It’s not enough to ex-
pect technology to prevent in-
sider misdeeds. Instead, we need 
a multifaceted set of strategies that 
address all elements of the taxono-
my: the organization (including its 
culture and goals), the system (in-
cluding the completeness and cor-
rectness of its implementation of de 
jure policy and its ability to learn 
de facto behavior), the environ-
ment (including legal restrictions 
on monitoring and analysis), and 
the individual (including motiva-
tion and intent). Table 1 illustrates 
how the taxonomy, coupled with 
goals of prevention, detection, 
mitigation, remediation, and pun-
ishment, can suggest sensible and 
effective response options.
A s technologists, we often hope to use our skills to moni-
tor behavior and predict the new 
threats our systems will face. But 
the dynamic threat environment, 
coupled with continuing techno-
logical advancement, make it im-
possible to predict with certainty 
what our systems will look like and 
what features and functions they’ll 
provide. That same uncertainty 
makes it difficult to predict what 
insiders will do and when and how 
they’ll do it. However, the sub-
stantial literature on “workplace 
deviance”10 tells us with certainty 
that insiders will continue to be-
have badly, using our computer 
systems as a means or as a target. 
Thus, insider threat detection and 
mitigation will continue to be a 
vexing and persistent security—
and very human—problem. 
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Detection Embedded decoys; watchful 
monitoring
Prevention Create organizational policy Embed organizational policy User training, incentives, 
reminders, access control
Remind users of legal 
implications of their actions 
and of costs to organization
Mitigation Update related policies
Punishment Apply legal punishments
Remediation Update related policies
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